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PAROL WRITTEN CONTRACT IN
KENTUCKY
By JUDGE LYMAN CHALKLEY, Professor of Law, University of Kentucky,
College of Law.
Perhaps there is no parol written contract in Kentucky.
The rule of law laid down and recognized in the courts generally in
America-and there has been no departure in Kentucky-has been that announced in the opinion in Rann vs. Hughes. The question was first raised in
1765, when it was decided, in the case of Pillans vs. Van Mierop, that consideration was only required as evidence of intention to be bound, and that
where such evidence was effectually supplied in any other way, the want of
consideration would not affect the validity of a parol promise. The issue in
that case involved only a commercial contract in writing, and to that application the doctrine that a parol promise not supported by a valuable consideration is nevertheless binding because in writing, must be confined.
The law remained as laid down in Pillans vs. Van Mierop for thirteen
years, until the same question was again raised in the case of Rann vs.
Hughes, decided in 1778. In that case, the contention, founded upon the
former case, was that an administiatrix of an estate, who had promised in
writing to pay out of her own pocket money which was due from the estate
to the plaintiff, which promise was without consideration proceeding from her,
was nevertheless bound, the observance of the form required by the Statute
of Frauds making consideration unnecessary. The doctrine of Pillans vs. Van
Mierop was emphatically disclaimed in the opinion of the judges. The court
said:
"It is undoubtedly true that every man is by the law of nature bound to
fulfill his engagements. It is equally true that the-law of this country supplies no means nor affords any remedy to compel the performance of an agreement made without sufficient consideration. Such an agreement is ehudum
pactum ex quo non oritur actio; and whatsoever may be the sense of this
maxim In the civil law, it is in the last-mentioned sense only that it Is to be
All contracts are by the law of England diunderstood in our law......
vided Into agreements by' specialty and agreements by parol; nor is there
any such third class as some of the counsel have endeavored to maintain as
contracts In writing. If they be merely written and not specialties, they are
parol and a consideration must be proved."
The distinction between the contract by specialty or covenant, and the
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contract by parol here pointed out is fundamental and the two have very
different forces and effects. The contract by parol, whether written or unwritten, operates and has the force and effect only to raise an obliagtion froma promise, and in that case, only when the promise is founded upon a valua.ble consideration. On the other hand, the contract by pecialty or covenant,
operates and has the force and effect to impose an obligation upon a promise
reduced to writing, although the promise is not based upon a consideration.
This proposition is formulated in various phrases: "The contract under seal
requires no consideration;" "In a contract under seal, consideration is presumed;" "In a contract under seal the form raises the obligation."
Moreover, other writings than those embodying a promise have a widely
different force and effect, if sealed,- from the same writing unsealed. For example, an ordinary receipt, not sealed, may be rebutted, but, if sealed, operates
by way of estoppel, and the party is bound by its recitals. Other instances of
difference in force and effect between sealed and unsealed instruments are:
(1) A deed operates to effect a merger. A devisee in trust to sell lands and pay
debts, borrows money, by simple contract in writing, upon the faith of the
land, and then afterwards executes a deed charging the land with the same
debt; here the simple contract in wrting is merged and can not be sued
upon. (2) The discharge of a contract under seal can only be accomplished
by an instrument under seal when the discharge is to take place by agreement of the parties. A parol contract, whether in writing or not, may be
discharged by parol. ,(3) A representation or promise in an agreement respecting land, will, in many cases, run with the land, if the agreement is by
specialty; the rule is otherwise if only by parol. (4) Heirs and devisees will
be bound by an agreement by specialty if mentioned, but will not be bound by
an agreement by parol even if mentioned. (5) Authority to an agent to execute a deed must be by specialty. (6) A specialty is not mere evidence of
agreement, but is the very agrement itself, and, if lost or destroyed, must be
established, both as to the fact of execution and as to contents, before action
can be brought. A writing accompanying a parol agreement is only evidence,
and its production is not necessary to an action. (7) A specialty requires
formal delivery before it is operative. An unsealed instrument, being only
evidence, may be used for all purposes, although not delivered..
The remedies for breach of the obligation by specialty are through the
actions of debt and covenant, each requiring the production of -the writing
sued upon, each admitting only of the plea of non est factum where the issue
is as to the genuineness or obligation of the writing. The action of assumpsit
does not require the production of the writing, and the genuineness and obligation of the writing may be contested under a very wide general issue.
The Statute of Kentucky provides:

"',seal or scroll shall in no case be necessary to give effect to a deed or
other writing. All unsealed writings shall stand upon the same footing with
sealed writings, having the same force and effect and upon which the same
actions may be, founded. But this section shall not apply to, nor shall it alter,
any law requiring the state or county seal, or the seal of a court, corporation,
or notary, to any writing."--Carroll's Statutes, Sec. 471 (1909 ed.).
It Is apparent that the specialty has not been abolished. The provision
operates only to dispense with the necessity of affixing a seal or scroll in
order to the execution of a specialty. It is also apparent that the "same foot-
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ing" upon which both sealed and unsealed writings stand is that of the sealed
writing or specialty and not that of the unsealed writing or parol. It is also
sufficiently plain from the use of the word "all" and the position of this section in the chapter entitled "Contracts"--rather than "Conveyances" or
"Land"--that the application of the section is not to be restrained to the deedof conveyance of land nor to those cases in which an instrument under seal
was required at common law.
This construction receives color from Sees. 2514 and 2515, Carroll Statutes (1909 ed.), providing that the period of limitation within which an action
may be brought upon a bond, recognizance, or written contract, shall be the
same; and also from the cases of Newberger vs. Adams, 92 Ky. 26; Helton vs.
Asher, 103 Ky. 730, deciding that it is necessary to the validity of a writing
concerning the sale of land, that it should be delivered as well as signed by
the party to be bound.
It would seem that all contracts in Kentucky reduced to writing, whether
sealed or unsealed, are specialties, and that the only contract in Kentucky
requiring consideration for its validity is the unwritten contract. .
From these considerations, it would seem that the division of contracts
in Kentucky is into contracts in writaig and contracts not in writing, the
former having the nature, charact"Astics, incidents, functions, limitations
and requirements as to execution and delivery, force and effect, of the contract by specialty as enforced in the courts of Kentucky at the time of the
enactment of this statute.

THE LAWYER AND THE CORPORATION
By HON. BOYD WINCHESTER, of the Louisville Bar.
It is a matter worthy of serious consideration whether the accumulation
and the predominance of pecuniary interests are not subjecting the legal
profession too often, if not too complacently, to the promotion of ignoble purposes. Are not the finer and nobler elements, the traditional dignity and
honor of the profession being impaired as corporate power increases and absorbs the larger part fo its members?
Of course, the clear interest of society requires that every cause, every
person, natural or artificial, even every criminal, should be fully defended.
There should not be set up for the profession any austere code of ideal
morals. No heavier burden is laid on the conscience of the lawyer than on
that of every other man engaged in a lawful pursuit.
While the law is practiced for money, there are standards of aspiration
and honor, professional ethics, conscious and unconscious, which are above
and apart from mere gain. There are shyster lawyers and quack doctors,
as there are mercenary persons in every vocation, but the rule, with the legal
fraternity, let it be said, is largely otherwise.
Governor Wilson in an address before the American Bar Association in
1910, presented an inquiry worthy of very serious reflection. He asked, "has
not the lawyer allowed himself to become part of the industrial development? Has he not been sucked into the channels of business? Has he not
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changed his attitude and the spirit of the profession? Has he not become
h part of the mercantile structure, rather than part of the general social
structure of our Commonwealth, as he used to be? Has he not turned away
from his former interests and duties, and become narrowed to a technical
function?" Then he adds, "The lawyer does not play the part he used to
play, he does not show the spirit in affairs he used to show, he does not
do what he might do, with his disinterested and earnest advice, which is so
much needed in the exigent processes of reform, in the busy processes of legislation, through which we are passing with so single a mixture of hope and
apprehension."
These are mighty thoughts on the question of the lawyer's profession
being one peculiarly affected with a public interest.
There can be no doubt that the immense growth of corporations, and
the glittering prizes which they have held out to able lawyers, have tended
both to specialize and narrow the activity of the leading men of the bar.
In their hands the. law has become, in a sort, commercialized. The word
is not used in an offensive sense. Legal advice has been necessary to the
captains of industry. Vast undertakings have needed the skilled service
of the ablest lawyers at every step of their formation and conduct, with
the result that many of the finest minds in the profession have become
rather business men than lawyers. Their range is not so great as that of the
older practitioners; it is hard for them to conceive of the law as a whole,
and their profession is one that calls for service of the public as well as of
their clients. It would not be just to say that the majority of lawyers are
unmindful of their duty to the public. Yet one must concede that Mr. Bryce,
that profound student of our institutions, in an article giving his impressions
of the changes since he made his first studies here, was justified in mentioning the "diminution and well-nigh disappearance of the class of great lawyers
who gave their time and strength, not only to legal reform, but to the leadership of all good public causes."
The relation of a lawyer to his client involves questions which touch, at
vital points, the general interests of society, and the whole body of the profession; and which, like all questions of moral and social duty, assume new
interest and importance whenever, from the force of circumstances, public
attention is specially directed upon them.
No one would deny to the lawyer the right to serve a soulless corporation,
having Its being only by virtue of a charter. To represent it as a matter
of strict professional right and on grounds of solid public interest, he is as
fully justified in doing so in all fair and honorable ways as if it were the
most beneficent institution which philanthropy ever founded or benevolence
ever administered. But the corporation is not satisfied to receive professional
service such as is rendered to other clients, however faithful and able, but
will accept no less measure of loyalty than that described by Lord Brougham,
in his speech before the House of Lords, in defense of Queen Caroline: "The
advocate, by the sacred duty which he owes his client, knows, In the discharge of that office, but one person In the world-that client and none
other; to serve that client by all expedient means; to protect that client at
all hazards and costs to all others, and, among others, to himself, is the
highest and most unquestioned of his duties."
Such a relation between lawyer and client must inevitably lead to the
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degradation of the profession, to its moral perversion. The lawyer owes to
his client unremitting attention to th ebusiness confieded to him, loyalty to
his interests, and, if necessary, to sacrifice his repose, his pleasures-to it,
but his enlightened conscience he should not sacrifice to any man; it is a
trust from Providence, for the abuse of which he alone is answerable.
Sydney Smith maintains that "No man can expect to be innocent before
God, or respectable before men, who sacrifices to wealth or power the fixed
and firm opinions of his life, or who puts his moral principles to sale, and
barters his honor for the baubles of the world."
It Is this relation that, too frequently, exists between the corporation and
its lawyer, which causes the public to hold lawyers largely responsible for
practices that circumvent the law and the provisions of statutes, and court
procedure, that might put a stop to them or square them with what the interests of the whole community demand. Naturally the public distrusts and
regards with suspicion lawyers conspicuous in such service. It supposes them
to be in sympathy, if not in league, with those to whom it ascribed a degree of
selfishness, which, in ffect, makes them public enemies, whatever their motives or private character may be.
Ex-President Roosevelt did not state it too strongly when he said, in an
address at'Harvard: "We all know as things actually are, many of the most
Influential and mostly remunerated members of the bar, in every center of
wealth, make it their special task to work bold and ingenious schemes, by
which their wealthy clients, individual or corporate, can evade the laws
which were made to regulate, in the interest of the public, the uses of wealth."
It is obvious that the corporation, having laid its hands upon every industrial element, is rapidly gathering within its coils, by virtue of steady
employment and fat fees, the best representAtives of the profession throughout the country. It is a great temptation to aspire to become the attorney of
a great railroad, trust or corporation of some kind, and, when once attained, men of the strongest characters find it difficult to escape some of
its baneful consequences-feeling of professional obligation, a breeding dread
of decapitation, consciously or unconsciously, controls them, or, at least,
destroys their independence and repose. There are the temptation and pressure to counsel and advocate what is not sound or right. Men are apt to
believe, sooner or later, in the cause they are engaged in. The mind, however vigorous and fearless, soon adapts itself to its surroundings, and is
subdued, as Shakespeare says of the dyer's hand, to the colors with which
It works. The influence of established, steady and lucrative interest on the
mind is almost irresistible, and slowly, but surely, warps and controls the
Judgment. The attorney is in danger of becoming so completely identified
and obsessed by the corporation retaining him, that he. finally makes its
Indiscriminate defense his supreme and all-absorbing professional mission.
We witness daily the insatiable growth of aggregate wealth, capitalized
and gigantic trusts, securing the enactment of legislation, not to establish
justice and insure domestic tranquillity or the public welfare, but to secure
unjust privileges and unequal advantages. Vast monled combinations are
constantly fostering class legislation, corrupting public life, lowering the tone
of official life, blunting public conscience, creating false standards in the popular mind and placing civil life upon the low lever of a mercenary struggle
and throwing legislation into the market for the scramble of jobbers, grafters
and chafferers.
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In their determination to compass their ends, the corporations require
and demand the active co-operation of their attorneys. It exacts of them not
only to study the powers which the Legislature may give and the rights
already granted, which can not be taken away or modified; the means by
which the powers claimed to be vested, may be extended and enforced, but,
as faithful employes, they must take the stump in political campaigns, whenever called upon, in spite of the fact that their honest sympathies may be
offended and antagonized.
It is a notorious fact that in the "lobby" of many legislatures, and even in
Congress, are found lawyers busy plying the members. Learned and astute
lawyers often receive their highest rewards for promoting legislation in the
interest of powerful combinations and successfully protecting serious violations of the law.
Soon as a young lawyer gives promise of becoming locally influential,
professionally or politically, some corporation places his name upon its roll
of employes, though it may not require his services at once, but merely to
prevent some unfriendly interest doing so.
As a profession, honorably followed, the law is the noblest; as the obsequious pensioner and servant of an arrogant corporation, it is the most contemptible.
It is true that the legal profession is not a charitable institution, nor is it
adopted as a mere pastime, or as a science or art aiming at perfection for
its own sake, with no thought of money or adequate compensation for services
rendered. The rewards of earnest and honorable exertion in its pursuit are
perfectly legitimate, and in every way desirable. Men practice law, as other
business avocations are pursued, to get money to support themselves and
families, and not from mere philanthropic motives. However, it is equally
true that the profession, in its broad and highest meaning, is no trade or
money grabbing vocation. Such a tendency would impair its traditional dignity and worth.
In justice, it must be admitted that it is not all corporations that leave
their taint upon the attorney whose brains they suck while they fill their
pockets. It is the law-defying corporation Which needs skillful legal asistance to keep its officials out' of jail; it is the speculative corporation, with
its lying prospectus and gulled investors, which demands lawyers to prevent
justice being visited upon its promoters; it is the public-service corporation, acquiring franchises by bribery and defending and exploiting them by
by systematic political corruption-these are the corporations which have
dragged down and discredited the repute of the attorneys they employ.
It is, of course, trite to say that corporation business has become so
dominant that if a lewyer refuses to work for a corporation, or to surrender
to it what was meant for the -service of his fellows, he will be in daiger of
being briefless. It is also true that almost all the leading lawyers have
been, at one time or another, retained by a corporation. The ability of a
mature lawyer, who had not been, would naturally be doubted. But nothing
is more certain than that a man may be a master of corporation law and
utilize this accoihplishment without selling out his minid for money or mortifying his conscience. Indeed, he may make .the noblest public use of his
rare knowledge and skill, gained in the private service of corporations.
Many people think the lawyer has nothing to do with the truth or even
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with conventional ethics; that his business is to pervert, to distort, to evade
and crown the truth with the thorns of all manner of technicalities. This is
a grievous mistake. There are some victories won for the wrong side; some
injustice may be made to triumph; some fraud successfully defended; some
weak judge may be misled; some assassin, with blood enough on his hands to
"incarnadine the multitudinous sea," may be rescued and turned loose upon
the community. The multitude may applaud this as an achievement, a brilliant
success; but these are triumphs that bring no lasting reputation; not in any
such way has the fame of great lawyers been won-men who sacredly regard
their profession, not as an instrument of chicanery, but as the plainest,
easiest, shortest way to the end of strife and justice; meu who strive to guard
and uphold the highest standards of professional ethics.
While the law, the expression of the sovereign will, which, as Burke declared, "with all its defects and errors, is the collected reason of ages, containing the principles of organized justice with the infinite variety of human
concerns," so long as, in the words of Sir William Jones:
"Sovereign law, that State's collected will,
O'er thrones and globes elate,
Sits Empress, crowning good and suppressing evil,"
exciting reverence in the virtuous and commanding submission from the
guilty; so long no anxious fear, no painful distrust need shake our confidence
in the permanence of what we justly deem the keystone of civil and political
liberty.
To the gracious protection of the law may be safely consigned, without
reserve, the guardianship of liberty and its most cherished blessings, with all
its various relations and all its dearest :-terests; and we may rejoice that so
sacred a cause is committed to a guide, of whom we can say, in the eloquent
words of Hooker: "Her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of
the world. All things in heaven and earth do her lhonor; the very least, as
feeling her care, and the greatest as not exempted from her power."
Let us hope that our lawyers may be recalled to the service of the
public as a whole from which they have been. drifting away; that thcy may
be reminded that, no matter what the exactions of modern legal business, no
matter what or how great the necessity of specialization in their practice of
the law," they are not servants of special interests, the mere expert counsellors of this, that or the other group of business men; but guardians of the
general peace, the guides.of those who seek to realize by some best accommodation the rights of men; and above all the servants of society, the bond
servants of justice."

